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Tacit Knowing, Moral 
Development and Pluralism:
Thoughts on mentoring, 
judgment and reform
La epistemología del conocimiento tácito es básica para una
acción inteligente en la ética del asesoramiento personal.
Los modelos estructurales y funcionales presentados en este
artículo proporcionan un mapa conceptual para tal acción.
La estructura del conocimiento tácito está formada por una
conciencia subsidiaria (“subsidiary awareness”), una concien-
cia focal (“focal awareness”) y los dos polos del conoci-
miento: la conciencia subsidiaria está en el polo personal (in-
terno) y la conciencia focal está en el polo (objetivo) exter-
no. La función del conocimiento tácito tiene tres aspectos:
selectivo, heurístico y persuasivo, y cada uno de ellos tiene
un modo o rasgo conativo y cognitivo. La fuerza motriz de
este modelo es la “pasión intelectual”, que en ética corres-
ponde a la posición apta para emitir un juicio, siempre a la luz
del principio de justicia. Como la epistemología del conoci-
miento tácito presupone la libre voluntad, ha de elegirse una
ética del deber1. En concreto, el análisis del modelo del co-
nocimiento tácito que aquí se presenta promueve el desarro-
llo y la mejora de la conciencia del adulto acerca de sus pro-
pios procesos de conocer, hacer y persuadir, prestando deli-
beradamente atención a estos procesos y a su fundamentación
en la libre voluntad. De esta forma, la comprensión del adul-
to favorece su tarea de apoyar, de ayudar al joven, a tomar
conciencia de esas mismas funciones en sí mismo. El aspecto
ético estriba en el deber de transmitir este conocimiento al
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1 El conocimiento tácito es una ética de la obligación, una ética deontológica que tiene unos
rasgos distintivos, tanto en las acciones como en las normas deontológicas. Este planteamineto
tiene sentido desde la perspectiva del modelo de “los dos polos del conocimiento” señalada en la
Figura 2. Los juicios morales particulares son implícitamente generales, aunque cada situación sea
“única”.
educando, para que pueda llegar a ser autónomo de forma in-
teligente, entrenándole en el desarrollo de esa actitud. De
esta manera, se promoverán tanto la moralidad de los rasgos,
el ser, como la moralidad de los principios, el hacer. Sin em-
bargo, la clave radica en favorecer que la voluntad haga lo
correcto, esto es, en encaminar la “pasión intelectual” hacia
la posición apta para el juicio.
palabras clave: conocimiento tácito, intencionalidad,
comprensión, juzgar.
The epistemology of tacit knowing in the ethics of mentoring
is meant to be grounding for intelligent action. The struc-
tural and functional models delineated above provide a con-
ceptual map for such action. The structure of tacit knowing
consists of subsidiary awareness and focal awareness and the
two poles of from-to knowing. Subsidiary awareness is on the
internal (personal) pole, focal awareness is on the external
(objective) pole. The function of tacit knowing has three as-
pects: selective, heuristic and persuasive, each having a cona-
tive and cognitive mode or trait. The driving force of this mo-
del is “intellectual passion” which in ethics is the judicial at-
titude, keeping the principle of justice in sight. Since the epis-
temology of tacit knowing presupposes free will, it must cho-
ose a duty bound ethics2. Specifically, the analysis of tacit
knowing model presented here hones the awareness of the
adult about his own processes of knowing, doing and persua-
sive acts, deliberately focusing on these processes and their
grounding in free will. The adult’s understanding then ser-
ves his nurturing function, the training of the young to at-
tain awareness of these same functions in him. The ethical as-
pect is the duty to pass on this knowledge to enable the child
to become intelligently autonomous, to train him to develop
the judicial attitude. Thus, both the morality of traits, that
is being, and the morality of principles, that is doing, are fos-
tered. However, the key is the fostering of the will to do
right, that is fostering the “intellectual passion” grounded
in the judicial attitude.
keywords: tacit-knowing, intentionality, understanding,
judging.
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2 Tacit Knowledge ethics is an ethics of obligation, a deontological ethics, with some features of
both act- and rule-deontology. This makes sense in light of the “two poles of knowing” model
presented in Figure 2. Particular moral judgements are implicitly general, even though each
situation may be “unique”.
1. Tacit knowing in problem situations
The modern version of the concept of tacit knowing was put into currency
by Michael Polanyi’s sayings, such as “we know more than we can tell”
(Polanyi, 1966, p. 4), and “the aim of skillful performance is achieved by the
observance of a set of rules which are not known as such to the person
following them” (Polanyi 1958/1962, p. 49). Or “all understanding is
achieved by indwelling” (Grene, 1969, p. 160). Indwelling is assimilating to
ourselves things outside to gain access to new meaning.
I will untangle these epistemological sayings by offering schemas onto
which I build my Neo-Polanyian proposal applied to moral development.
Michael Polanyi’s epistemology of Tacit Knowing takes into consideration
the knower and the known. He called it “from-to-knowing”. Although his
epistemology was innovative, his ethics remained underdeveloped. However,
he suggested a connection between his epistemology and ethics (Polanyi
1966, p. 17): to view the internalization of moral teachings as making them
the “proximal term” for application in practice. The proximal term means
“indwelling”, not observing. I wanted to see if the modified form of his
epistemology could underpin a sketch for an ethics of skillful mentoring in
a global society. Why an epistemology of the ethics of mentoring? One wants
one’s moral actions to be guided by an insight into how one comes to
principles and by the analysis of new situations. One needs to develop skills
in recognizing a new situation and of reassessing relations of situations to
principles. One needs to know more than efficient and convenient
application of a moral idea, an approach which may have sufficed in
traditional societies. It is necessary now to accommodate new particulars, or
even to reorganize and modify a network of principles in a pluralistic society.
My plan is to define my terms, present theoretical structural and
functional models followed by a practical model of levels of action in the
mentoring process.
The key ideas to be discussed here are: tacit knowing, judicial attitude
and universalizability.
Tacit knowing is not unconscious. It is of various levels of consciousness.
It is a continuum with two poles in which attention is directed from the
features or clues of the situation or thing, to the whole (Polanyi 1966, p. 87).
A shorthand form of this conception of tacit knowing is from-to knowing
(p. 10). We may be unable to specify the clues, these internal processes on
which we rely, but these clues support our recognition of the whole, the
situation or thing. The “whole” is the meaning of the act of recognition; we
attend to the whole, the subject of which can be specified.
The term “judicial attitude” comes from Polanyi’s explanation of the
duties of public intellectuals to truth (Polanyi Papers). Here it is used with
two meanings: epistemological and ethical, the epistemological underlies
the ethical.
1) Epistemologically, it is the commitment, readiness and ability to
choose, to assess and to integrate disparate clues into a judgement guided by
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a principle. It is a regulative idea. Freedom is a precondition for exercising
the judicial attitude.
2) In the ethical context, judicial attitude means to strive for the
actualization of universalizable principles. In its more familiar form, in the
public sphere, the judicial attitude is a commitment to the principles of
justice (the meaning of “justice” not completely formalized and fixed).
In Polanyian terms, Universalizability means not an established
universality, but universal intent, a claim that the statement ought to be
accepted by all (Polanyi, 1966, p. 78). Universalizability is a means to
introduce new standards (p. 69) with conviction, while respecting
established values.
All knowing, practical or theoretical, is grounded in tacit, non-explicit,
knowing. We rely on it when we attend to solving a problem, performing a
task or making a judgment. We may say, we have clues in our subsidiary
awareness while attending to what is in focal awareness.
From-to knowing: direction of awareness
From elements in subsidiary ➪ (vector of) integration ➪ to whole 
in focal awareness
As music teachers have known for centuries, the key to unlearning and
relearning something in an improved form, such as a piece for musical
performance (or diction, or writing, for that matter) is to shift focus from
what was in focal awareness, i.e., the task as it was –the completion of the
piece– and refocus on what was in subsidiary awareness –the position of
fingers, or lips, or the nuance of expression–.
Similarly, the key to dealing with a malfunctioning system is to refocus on
the clues to which the malfunction points, to the elements or particulars of the
whole, and to see how to reorganize these into a new coherent whole. As
Polanyi said with regard to conflicts of scientific frameworks, to change the form
of outcome, one must reassess and reorganize elements, go back to the premises
of the tacit inference (Grene, 1969, p. 213). This destroys the old inference,
giving space for reorganization. In other words, a form of analysis-and-synthesis.
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Figure 1.a
Figure 1.b
Learning: Oscillation between analysis and synthesis
Attention refocused on elements in subsidiaries ➪ elements examined,
adjusted and re-arrange ➪ synthesis of new whole ➪ focus redirected to
new whole
(The process can be repeated as needed)
The difficulty is to find criteria for a judgment of “coherence”.
Sometimes those inside a system consider the problem only an anomaly
and someone not so immersed must point out that the problem constitutes
a malfunction. In any case, one has to refocus not only on the troubling
particulars or elements, but on those particulars which are related to it in the
system. Since one can have only one focus at a time, focus will oscillate
between the particular and the whole until a re-organization, a reintegration,
is achieved. To be understood, the new reorganized integrated whole has to
be assimilated, interiorized (internalized). The assimilated whole becomes
part of subsidiary awareness, the background of knowing, the skill. We are
aware of these particulars now as they bear on the task at hand, but not in
themselves. These particulars force themselves into focus when an error, a
mis-fit, occurs in the process or performance.
All this seems simple enough, and part of common sense experience.
Polanyi put it this way:
Non-explicit practical knowing is “understanding by doing”.
“Our subsidiary awareness of tools and probes can be regarded now as
the act of making the form a part of our own body. We pour ourselves out
into them and assimilate them existentially by dwelling in them” (Polanyi,
1958/1962, p. 59). Theoretical knowledge is an abstract probe. “The structure
of knowing, revealed by the limits of specifiability, thus fuses our subsidiary
awareness of the particulars belonging to our subject matter with the
background of our knowing. To this extent our knowing is an indwelling”
(Grene, 1969, p. 134).
The paradox is, that while we focus on the particulars, let us say in
diction, as we repeat the word or phrase out of its context, it seems to lose
its meaning. We regain the meaning as the particulars are re-contextualized.
In moral knowledge, when our previous set of tacit moral knowledge no
longer applies in practice, when past moral teachings no longer seem to
make sense, and what was held to be an ethically integrated society begins
to disintegrate upon introduction of new particulars, it is time to refocus on
the particulars with an eye toward re-organization. The question is of-
course, what standards, frameworks or guidelines do we use.
Before we were aware of a breakdown, we applied standards and
frameworks passed down through tradition. We were attending to new
situations in the light of principles learned and “dwelled-in”. To know is to
know how and when to use something. Strange as it may seem to draw a
parallel between connoisseurship in art or science and moral judgment, it is
enlightening to do so. One can “construct” a new theory of art, or for that
matter a new theory in one of the sciences, only after immersion in the
tradition, a prior tacit knowing, that is having the old theory in subsidiary
awareness. From this we attend to the new situation, with its new elements
and strained connections on which the old theory no longer bears fully, thus
we recognize an anomaly, something that “does not fit” and needs to be
dealt with. In other words, we have a problem.
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All search starts with a problem. We can deal with a problem by ignoring
it, accommodating to it, or if the stress of accommodation is too great on
our framework, by reorganizing our framework, by finding new guidelines.
In extreme cases, we may consider discarding our framework altogether, in
which case we find that in constructing a new one we do so in reference to
the old one, positive or negative. More than that, we rely on what we know
from the old framework, on a sense of when something “works”. Re-
construction/reorganization always has a large tacit element. We have an
“inkling” of a coherence, of what makes sense. Reorganization is only partly
explicit. “Reorganization” does not mean collecting all elements and
deliberately putting them together into a new construct with connections
defined.
To illustrate: Think of an old, comfortable, functional relationship such
as the parent-child one in an immigrant family. Put stress on it by
introducing several new, powerful elements from the outside such as
geographical, social or cultural relocation, and the framework may crack
open, the “comfort” links fall out, new peer influences batter the
“functional” aspect. What to do? Draw up a list of rules for parenting?
Neither inductive nor deductive approaches work.
As history bears out, societies and moral communities constructed by
applying explicitly laid out detailed rules unconnected to previous experience
and traditions, proved to be not viable. The soviet social system and
Cambodia’s “cultural Revolution” come to mind. Neither is it a viable option
to try every imaginable version until we hit on a workable one, i.e., error
elimination. Just as a scientist, immersed in his background knowledge makes
the effort to be acquainted with the new elements, now has the ability to
anticipate a workable solution, has hunches which guide him toward a
sensible course of action on which he embarks as a responsible choice, so the
moral thinker, relying on his background knowledge, on his framework as a
reference and his deliberate reach toward new elements, has the ability to
approach an ethical problem however unfamiliar it may be. In both cases, the
“problem situation” involves new elements introduced which necessitates
finding the new multiple relationships which these elements can sustain in a new
configuration. The “finding” is a guess, but an intelligent guess. It is an insight
reached by what C.S. Peirce called “abduction”.
Polanyi’s analogy for solving unfamiliar problems with an indeterminate
outcome at the time of approaching the problem, was the putting together
of a puzzle as a group effort. Each individual has one piece (the one he
knows best) and all have one goal-completion. Each looks over the whole
situation, and by a system of spontaneous coordination, an insight, the
puzzle pieces are fitted together into a new picture. The tacit elements are:
the attitude toward the goal and the insight. Calling this process “puzzle-
solving” is not to trivialize the issue, neither is this by way of mystification.
Each person makes a judgment while committed to the goal: in the case of
scientists, to find out the truth about a part of reality; in the case of the
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moral thinker, to find a just solution to a moral or social problem. Let’s say,
a pluralistic cooperative group comes to a “vision” of the “big picture”, a
new ethical ideal, toward which it can work. Polanyi called it “mutual
adjustment”. Competing self-interest, though acknowledged and examined
(that is the premises need to be found), these competing self-interests needs
to be supervened for the common good. The analogy to science is that
competing theories are not necessarily incommensurable, i.e., it is not the
case that one has to “win”; or that they are mutually untranslatable. This
situation can be resolved by finding a higher-order theory which
encompasses both.
Polanyi never specified “steps” to arrive at solutions, indeed he said there
are no recipes and no certain ends. However, drawing from his descriptions
of scientific insight, we may say the following. When we are looking for a
“vision”, the “big picture”, we are engaged in the following activities, for
which the precondition is freedom from dogma: 
We examine the elements under “magnification” (Polanyi, 1966, p. 18);
this destroys the existing pattern, the connection between the elements; we
“rearrange” the connections between elements, that is, come to an insight
into a new pattern –this is not by hit-and-miss–, but by anticipation, a
hunch (p. 76); as far as possible, we explicitly state the new relations between
the elements, as well as note which elements no longer participate and
which new ones do; we recover the meaning of the pattern by internalizing
it, i.e., tacit integration (p. 19). Steered by responsibility, a social constraint
(p. 77), for advancing towards the new goal, we now find the emergence of
a new ideal taking shape.
Just as the physical world is not entirely of our making, neither is the
social world, yet, in our dealing with it, especially in changing it, we have an
obligation when we make claims, to make these claims universalizable.
Relativism and special pleading have no place in our choices. The knower
and claim-maker, even though he shapes his own knowledge and anticipated
goals, he is in the setting of an impersonal world. Another way to think
about it is that the tacit and the explicit are connected and freedom and
obligation to principles are connected. There is a new awareness of
principles by which one lived in the social sphere, of a need to re-examine
these carefully. There is a new awareness of the anomaly or the particulars
which caused the “break”. These have to be examined to see their intrinsic
value and their function in a re-organized whole. This is the explicit aspect.
The tacit aspects are the process of insight into how everything fits together
and the process of interiorizing (internalizing) the new frame by living in it.
There is no explicit “to do” list to follow, although there is a process of
evaluation of elements and their connections. When do we know if we
found a workable solution? We recognize a well functioning system as one
where each part contributes as well as draws on the whole, i.e., when it is an
integrated whole. The “recognition” is a tacit process.
Now, by way of demystifying the above comments, I offer some technical
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details on a schema to guide us in thinking through the problem. We will
be surveying the nature and function of tacit knowing, and exploring its
possible role in dealing with a “problem situation”.
2. The structure of Tacit Knowing
The epistemology of Polanyi’s tacit knowing was to bridge the fact/value
dichotomy prevalent a few decades ago when logical positivism reigned and
a strict empiricism dominated the conception of the sciences. According to
Polanyi, severing fact from value discounts the knower’s active participation
in all knowing, i.e., knowing becomes a collection of disembodied ideas.
Bridging the gap, he insisted, does not mean collapsing fact into value, or
denying objectivity. Collapsing fact into value and denying objectivity
would be to commit the opposite error, subjectivism. However, because fact
and value are connected, concepts such as truth and objectivity need to be
redefined, as will become clear in the following sketch.
Tacit knowing is a continuum between two poles of knowing, the
internal (personal) pole and the external (objective) pole. The poles are
connected by intentionality. The personal pole supports the external pole,
and without it the external pole is adrift.
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Figure 2.
The structure of two poles of knowing
From
Internal (personal) pole
1. Subsidiary awarenes
2. Tacit assertion
3. Guessing
4. Claim of truth
4a. Striving to reach 
the goal
Vector of intentionality*
“intellectual passions”
integrated into
tacit inference
integration
responsible judgement
judicial attitude
To (In general terms)
External (objective) pole
Focal awareness
Content of assertion
Guessing right
(validated)** by test of
experience
Truth itself
Reaching the goal (the
principle)
➪
➪
➪
➪
*Vectors spring from the internal pole and are forms of will
**In Ethics: validation; in natural sciences: verification
Earlier I said that a shorthand way of thinking of tacit knowing is from-to
knowing. From is the internal pole, to is the external pole. To round out our
conception of tacit knowing, the following pairs of poles and their
connecting vectors should be considered; all pairs are aspects of knowing
and each pair highlights an important characteristic of tacit knowing.
1) The first pair is to explain the structure of understanding by a brief
sketch: Subsidiary awareness of clues or elements are “linked” to focal
awareness of the whole by the act of integration. For example, we have a
background awareness of features (the elements) of a face but we are focusing
on the face (the whole), our tacit knowing integrated the features into a
coherent whole. If we focus on the mouth of a speaker, for example, we loose
sight of the face. It will recede into the background, into subsidiary awareness.
Or, another example: When we read a sentence, we are focusing on the
meaning of it, to understand it as an instance of communication. However, if
the sentence is written either in a foreign language in which we have slight
proficiency, or if it is written in a jargon unfamiliar to us, we will be focusing
on the words. Only after we think we understand most of the words
(elements) can we try to make sense of the string of words as a sentence. If our
mind has made the proper integrations by the use of grammar, we understand
the meaning of the sentence. If not, then not only the elements, but the
linkages also need to be clarified by focusing on them individually and in
relation to the whole. Examples of this can be found in the
incomprehensibility of jargon to the uninitiated and their gradual proficiency
in its use in the process of learning. The point is that the mind tacitly
integrates elements into a whole, unless the elements are mostly unfamiliar.
2) Another pair of poles highlights the structure of the “logic of tacit
knowing”. Tacit assertion at the internal pole and the content of what is
asserted at the external pole. When I make a statement such as “Smith is a
liar”, the statement consists of the assertion, rather tacit assertion, meaning
“I believe it is true that Smith is a liar” and the content of the statement
“Smith is a liar”. The tacit assertion is linked to the content of the statement
by intentionality. If I check the content of the statement and in experience
it does not turn out to be the case that Smith is a liar, the content is false
and I cannot reassert the sentence because my intention was to make a true
statement –or so it is expected–.
3) The third pair of poles highlights understanding. When we size up a
new situation at a glance, initially we are making an intelligent guess as to
its meaning, e.g., “Jones murdered the cat”. This initial guess can be said to
be at the internal pole of knowing. We make a tacit inference from the
elements of the situation, Jones with a weapon, the dead cat, to the whole
which is its meaning “Jones murdered the cat”. We must subject this guess
to the test of experience, analyze the elements of the situation and make an
inference to the objective situation. If Jones actually murdered the cat, we
may speak of “guessing right”. Guessing right is at the external pole, as the
guess had to pass the test of agreeing with objective reality.
 ESE Nº4 2003

 , 
  
:  
, 
 
4) The fourth pair of poles highlights values embedded in tacit knowing.
If I make a statement as a claim of truth, “Jones has done me wrong”, I must
make this statement with responsible judgement. Responsible judgement
originates at the internal pole of knowing. Truth itself is at the external pole.
Responsible judgement springs from the judicial attitude, which is, as I said
above, a commitment and ability to choose and to integrate disparate
elements into a judgement guided by a principle. If the claim of truth is
made without responsible judgement, the link to truth is severed, and in the
public realm the principle of justice is lost. The claim to truth without a
connection to the principle of universalizability is invalid, i.e., there are no
relative truths; relative truths are privileged rules for special cases to make
an exception. Ideally, only if everyone tells the truth can claims be believed.
Note that claims to truth unconnected to external reality are subjective.
Both in the case of relativism and of subjectivism, principles are lost. The
claim to truth without responsible judgement is to be distinguished from
error, which was illustrated in the example “Smith is a liar”. In the case of
error, the principle is not lost. Another attempt can be made at a statement
and checked by experience. The intention to reach truth has not been
compromised.
To summarize: the link between the two poles of knowing carry various
names depending on the aspects of knowing they connect: inference,
intentionality, responsible judgement, integration, judicial attitude. The
general term for all these versions of the link between the poles is
“intellectual passion”. This is the vector. Inference connects tacit assertion
to content, intentionality connects subsidiary awareness to focal awareness,
responsible judgement connects claim of truth to truth, integration
connects clues to the whole formed out of the clues, judicial attitude
connects striving to reach the goal to reaching the goal which is the
principle. The term “intellectual passion” indicates the joining of cognitive and
conative forces in knowing, and is the technical term for the vector between the poles.
The structure of the two poles of knowing as applied to ethics is the
following, as shown in Figure 2.4:
Striving to reach the goal (commitment) ➪ judicial attitude in
responsible judgment ➪ reaching the goal, principle 
(of justice for example)
3. The functions in tacit knowing
To understand the process of knowing grounded in the tacit, we will have
to look at it in its active mode. Tacit knowing performs its function through
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Figura 2.4
the vector called “intellectual passions”, which has three aspects: selective
function, heuristic function and persuasive function. Polanyi distinguished
these aspects for the purpose of analyzing the process of understanding and
learning in the sciences. All three aspects of the function of intellectual
passions in tacit knowing may be fallible, therefore, for Polanyi, tradition
and the criticism of knowledgeable peers was the guide. Without examining
his use of these notions here, we will see if a version may be useful for our
purposes in understanding, teaching and learning moral subjects.
–cognitive trait: noting the regularity of events
Selective function –conative trait: choosing intrinsic value (moral-
aesthetic)
Heuristic function –cognitive trait: recognition of the ethical principle
–conative trait: self-modifying act of “living in” the
principle
Persuasive function
–cognitive trait: demonstration of value of the
principle (to convince the novice)
–conative trait: attracting the will (to gain the
intellectual sympathy of the novice)
All three aspects –selective, heuristic and persuasive functions– have a
cognitive and a conative trait. The conative trait is the “mover” of the
cognitive trait. The three aspects –selective, heuristic and persuasive– are
intertwined, and the first two (selective and heuristic) are functions within
an individual, while the third (persuasive function) is between individuals,
especially between mentor and novice.
a) The cognitive trait of selective function means that one’s awareness picks
out the regularity of events with respect to some notion to which these
events are relevant. The conative trait of selective function means that the
event picked out has an intrinsic (not utilitarian, not trivial) value. The value
is moral and has an “aesthetic feel”. The conative trait springs from the
personal pole of tacit knowing.
To illustrate with an example when there is an existing principle:
Smith is a mentor, grounded in ethical principles which are normally in
his subsidiary awareness, that is the ethical principles are normally part of
his tacit knowledge. In everyday speech, they are “second nature to him”.
The bipolar structure of tacit knowledge makes it possible to direct
attention onto something that is normally in the subsidiary and bring it to
focal awareness while it is being examined, in this case, to bring the
principle to focal attention (Figure 2). Looking at the first two functions
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Figure 3.
Functions of intellectual passions in tacit knowing
(selective and heuristic) of the vector “intellectual passions”, we see the
following (Figure 3).
Notice the selective functions operating: Smith comes upon a situation at
work where coworker Harrington copied an unmarked file, which Smith
forgot to pick up from the secretary’s desk. Smith saw the copy and his
immediate response was “Harrington stole my file”. Harrington often picks
things up that interest him from the secretary’s desk without asking anyone.
It is relevant that he seldom asks whether these things are for the taking or
if they are someone’s property. Therefore Smith had been watching
Harrington. The selective function of Smith’s tacit knowing has become
active. The cognitive trait of selective function picked out the above-
described events as regularities. The conative trait of the selective function
picked out these events as non-trivial ones, whose (negative) moral value
had a meaning (a negative aesthetic feel). This is the first function at work.
b) Now the second, heuristic function: The cognitive trait of heuristic
function means the ethical recognition of the goal of striving. The conative
trait of heuristic function means a self-transforming act of reaching near the
goal and “living” it.
Continuing the above example: We may say that in the process of
Smith’s tacit knowing, the cognitive aspect of his heuristic function
recognized the moral principle which applied to the situation with
Harrington. This recognition, was a (negative) moral-aesthetic response in
this case. The conative aspect of his heuristic function renewed the self-
transforming act of striving toward the moral principle of honesty: Smith
“lives in” the principle. His commitment to the principle and his ability to
recognize it was evoked by the heuristic function; he drew on the selective function as
an aid. This is the strength of the tacit, the being and doing of the knowing self which,
in the delineation of the structure of tacit knowing was identified by the name
“judicial attitude”. As I said above, these functions may be fallible: Smith
will still have to check if his guess was right and Harrington copying the file
in fact constituted stealing.
c) The third, the persuasive function is a communal one and a mentoring
one: the communication of the individual processes of selection and self-
transformation. The persuasive function also has a cognitive and a conative
trait. The person, who had transformed himself so that he lives approaching
his ethical goal, attempts to attract the novice to the ethical goal by gaining
his intellectual sympathy. In his role as mentor he attempts to evoke the
conative trait in the novice, he attempts to tap the personal pole of tacit
knowing. We may think of it as tapping the novice’s will. The cognitive
aspect of persuasive function consists of demonstrating the value of the
principle which is the goal of action.
The key to understanding all three aspects of the function of tacit
knowing is to take the position that the precondition for the conative trait
is freedom. That is, tacit knowing is based on freedom of the will, without
this, ethical choices are neither choices nor moral.
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An example, when we are searching for a principle in a pluralistic
situation:
In a practical ethical situation, a pluralist community deals with
competing “accepted ways of doing things”. Our task is to search out the
premises on which the acceptance is based, in order to find the function of
it. For example, such behavior by a child as smoking or drinking alcohol or
roaming without supervision is not condoned by adults in many western
industrial societies. This attitude assumes that childhood is a protected
status for a vulnerable stage of life.
A child’s smoking, drinking, etc., is condoned in some societies where
childhood is not considered a separate status in these terms, where children
participate in adult activities, i.e., imitate what adults do. There may be other
specified non-accepted behaviors, such as using speech-patterns in-appropriate
in relation to elders in general, or calling a person by his given name, etc.
In another community, a child’s behavior of smoking, drinking, etc. may
not be condoned officially, i.e., he should not do it in front of elders
because this behavior is (a minor) taboo in the community, and breaking
these taboos shows disrespect to the elders and social norms in general.
However, he can do these actions in private with his friends, which the
elders will pretend not to notice unless he makes a public scene and “brings
shame” on the extended family. The child, although cared for, may not have
a separate status by custom in the community, even though he may have
one legally.
Here are three versions of what is condoned behavior. In a pluralist
situation, such as a school, how does one make a reasonable and just rule?
Is there a supervening principle under which the three cases may fall? To
find such a principle, we have to find the premises underlying the three
versions and see how they may be related. Tacit knowledge epistemology’s process
is to go back to the premises to be able to reorganize into a new whole. What can
these premises be? Our conceptions of how children fit into the communal
order? Whether they must be molded to an accepted pattern or they grow
in a (divinely or naturally) preordained way? Whether there is such a stage
as childhood? What is the conception of “good life”? The premises must be
found. In scientific fields, this is done by those steeped in the scientific tradition, yet
open to the possibility and necessity of new discoveries, of change, of emerging new
knowledge. In the practical ethical situation the same task can be performed
by a similar group of open-minded culturally knowledgeable people
committed to an emerging better society.
To aid the search for premises, we will perform the analysis, again aided
by the description of tacit knowing above.
3.1. Selective function
The cognitive trait of the selective function is to pick out the regularity of
events. This assumes some kind of hypothesis or framework or “guess”
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which allows one to recognize regularities. The conative trait of selective
function means to choose an intrinsic moral value. This act also assumes
having some sort of hypothesis or “guess” in mind. The difficulty is that the
insight, the “aha” experience of forming a hypothesis/guess seems to
require the having of a guess. A circularity? How to get out of this bind? By
noting, that the mind uses multiple overlapping analogies to find
regularities and similarities when confronted by disparate objects, events
and customs or by a complex phenomenon/situation.
For example, multiple analogies to understand the phenomenon of
insight would work like this: Let’s say we could use four analogies to
highlight various aspects of insight, keeping in mind that each analogy
captures a feature, as well as misses others. (The following analogies are
adaptation of Polanyi’s examples).
1) When we recognize a face in a crowd, we can’t tell exactly how we do
it;
2) When we recognize the topography of an object/place, it is
recognized as a “whole” containing significant relationships between
the parts. When we focus on the parts, we can describe them, but the
relationships cannot be described exhaustively and exactly;
3) Observing problem-solving (in chimps, for example): we observe their
behavior –they seem to look around, attend to and assess the
environment before attempting a solution–;
4) In recognizing living shapes, although we can describe some of their
characteristics as opposed to characteristics of non-living shapes, we
cannot definitively define them. Sorting out these analogies, we get
the following picture of “insight”.
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Table.
Table of Multiple analogies of insight
Analogy
pick out a face
recognize
topography
problem-solving
recognizing
living shapes
etc.
feature captured
recognize whole,
suddenly know
but cannot tell
recognize whole
(old integration) 
recognize relations
strategy, building
on old bits of
knowledge
introspection
new integration
feature missing
don’t know clues
new integration
new integration
introspection
misleading feature
not intentional
recognition
recognition of
previously known
whole
explaining insight
with “insight”
“recognition”
Multiple overlapping analogies are richer and less hazardous than simple
analogies. Simple analogies often carry inappropriate properties along with
the selected one into the new domain, and tend to focus on surface
descriptive aspects. In multiple integrated analogies each analogy is to
explain a particular feature. If our analysis is to be fruitful, we must note for
each analogy which features are captured/missing/misleading. When the
analogies are superimposed, they can yield the dominant aspect one is
looking for. Multiple analogies are used by the mind as composites, and
they are recoverable (Vosniadou and Andrew, 1989).
3.2. Heuristic function
My suggestion is that we cannot proceed until we take into consideration
the heuristic function along with the selective function. These functions are
not sequential, they are separated for analysis. For this reason: The cognitive
aspect of heuristic function is the recognition of a principle, i.e., the insight.
The conative aspect of heuristic function is a transformative one, “living in”
the principle. This principle at this stage is only a “guess”, a “vision”, a guide
to find the way to an emerging better society. The operational principles will
have to be found deliberately. A suggestion to that was offered above,
“finding the vision”.
To go back to our analysis: The cognitive trait of heuristic function, is the
recognition of the principle applicable in the problem situation. Many
situations are ambiguous (not well-formed problems), therefore “picking
out” both the regularity of events, and the intrinsic value of events is
difficult. One cannot rely on subsidiary awareness or tacit knowing only.
One needs to focus one’s awareness explicitly on as many of the clues as
possible, one by one, then on their interconnections, to see how these could
be re-integrated into a meaningful whole. This can be done because
awareness is directed, there are two poles of knowing. The resulting “whole”
will have both tacit and explicit aspects.
A familiar example is learning to play a musical instrument as described
earlier: it is a process of oscillation between analysis and synthesis, in an
upward spiral until the goal is achieved –a technically good, yet expressive
performance–.
The above description of selective and heuristic functions were shown, together, to
deal with the ambiguous situation, when the choice of applicable principle is not clear.
Principles can never be applied dogmatically. They are only ideals. Maxims which fall
under them are only guides, not fixed rules. So one’s “sense” or tacit knowing is
always called upon in judgment.
3.3. Persuasive function
The persuasive function in practice means that one has to demonstrate in a
dispute how the principle applies, how one examines the elements of the
situation, regroup and reassess these elements and check the facts. This is the
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cognitive trait. We must keep in mind that the resulting assertions are
fallible. Factual knowledge and clarity are vital when weighing an ethical
situation, relativist notions notwithstanding. The conative trait consists of
gaining the intellectual sympathy of the hearer, so he will be receptive to
the demonstration.
It is the mentor’s task to nurture the judicial attitude, to show the novice
in practice how to recognize good choices, make decisions, and on what
bases commitments to principles are made. It is also the mentor’s task to
show that commitment can be an intelligent choice.
Training in moral knowing and doing is by fostering the formation of
moral traits and moral being of the young, it is the fostering of judicial
attitude. This process moves between the tacit and the explicit, up and
down the hierarchy of layers of elements, maxims and ideals. The
overarching principle is the universalizability principle.
4. The ontological map-mentor and novice
The “maps” of structure and function of tacit knowing and its vector
presented above were meant to illuminate how the morality of principles
are activated, i.e., the “doing” of moral action. The following ontological
“map” of the structure and formation of the morality of traits, is meant to
illuminate the emergence of the moral being. It is not to be taken as a
“construction” of morality (Figure 4).
The mentor in fostering the growth of the young, engages in the
development of a moral being which is not a duplicate of his own moral
self, but which is trained to make use of a scaffolding similar to his own.
The mentor relies on accumulated experience and learning, draws on
principles in his subsidiary awareness. When he is confronted with a
situation, he “takes it in” in a glance, then analyses it into its elements. He
reassesses the situation which may require a reorganization and
reintegration of elements into a new whole. This new whole is seen as falling
under a principle (more or less). The principle is in focal attention during
this process. At the completion of the reintegration (the reintegration being
a tacit process), the principle finds it way into subsidiary awareness again,
but accessible for future needs. In the mentoring mode, the mentor is alert
to assess situations and to analyze those into elements, and at the same time
“lives in” the skillful practice of traversing the maps I have presented.
The novice or child must shape the entire emerging edifice of his moral
being on the initial trust in the mentor. Without trust the conative trait of
the vector of tacit knowing, intellectual passions, cannot be activated.
Without an activated conative trait, the cognitive trait is barren. In plain
language, the mentoring relation starts with trust in order to instill
principles, and only later are the principles drawn into focal awareness. Put
another way, without the personal pole, the objective pole which is situated
in reality, is severed from the self. The personal pole, the origin of the
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judicial attitude, sustains living principles. Therefore, the mentor, mindful
of this grounding, guides the novice through the spiral of ethical learning,
of the emerging moral self. To show how a new situation can be recognized,
the mentor offers descriptions consisting of information regarding human
action as distinguished from events, information on processes and
description of causes for such events. He offers explanation for human
action as intentional action (a teleological explanation) and explanation for
action as falling under a certain “law” or rule as distinguished from causal
explanations (“why”-s) for events which are subsumed under a “law”. In the
scheme of tacit knowing, teleological explanations are not reducible to
consequences of behavior, as human intentions cannot be eliminated.
5. Connecting structural, functional and ontological “maps”
By mapping showing and doing onto the two poles of knowing, fact and
value in moral action were connected on a continuum. This allowed for
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Figure 4.
Emergence of the Moral Being (to be read from bottom of figure upward)
Mentor:
Novice:
Mentor’s intelligent moral existence:
principles and elements in subsidiary, now
attended to, become accessible
elements reorganized if reform is needed-or
elements reintegrated when renewal of principles
occurs
were in the subsidiary, now attention to, to
examine them
learned from his mentor
Mentor’s duty to novice:
renewed explanation of principle accompanied
by description of example contextualized
described, pointed out, counter-examples given
described, pointed out
(practice)
verbal statement repeated after mentor
the conative foundation-mentor attracts will of
novice
elements for teaching
(focal)
principle, reintegration
or reorganization
(subsidiary)
elements
(subsidiary ↔ focal)
principles
(in subsidiary)
elements reintegrated
(subsidiary ↔ focal)
more elements
connected
(focal ↔ subsidiary)
elements
(focal ↔ subsidiary)
principle (focal)
trust (subsidiary)
validation of moral action, that is, moral action mapped on such a
continuum is not subjective. (Indeed, subjective action cannot be moral
action, as it is reflexive only onto the self and is not tied to objective
reality). Furthermore, moral action is not derived from facts alone, but facts
linked to values, that is, the objective pole of knowing linked to the
personal internal pole.
The mentor understands that his moral choices are premised on freedom
of the act of responsible choice manifested in his judicial attitude. He
fosters this attitude in the young, keeping the relevant principles in sight,
noting that the universalizability principle overarches all others.
6. From epistemology to ethics
With respect to the epistemology of science Polanyi said that belief in the
reality of scientific value guides the inquiry and allows reform of standards
with universal intent, as well as allows respect for values and encourages
inquiry. (Polanyi, 1966, p. 69) Although the choices made are individual
acts, the ideals and principles which guide action are universals in the sense
of universalizable principles. Individual choices are commitments (p. 77)
Polanyi called “universal intent”.
In the ethical realm “universal intent” becomes the “judicial attitude”.
The problematic issue arises with respect to principles, “standards and
ideals” which in the social sphere today are much more pluralistic than it is
possible to have in the scientific community. Pluralism is a social necessity.
The idea that pluralistic expressions of ethical rules can be subsumed under
a few universal principles is a workable idea if universal principles mean
universalizable ones. Pluralistic expressions of ethical rules encourage
inquiry and the development of a more mature judicial attitude. The
commitment is made not to following a rule dogmatically, rather it is made
to universal principles as guides. Pluralism would not be possible without
the freedom of choice, which is also the precondition for tacit knowing. So
the duty of the mentor, and later the “apprentice”, is multi-layered: to
recognize which of the plural paths he has chosen or can choose, and how
this path relates to the universalizability principle.
This requires multiple, overlapping (but non-contradictory) and
hierarchical memberships: for example, an adult is generally a member of
more than one family, a member of a larger religious group (if any), an
ethnic group which partially overlaps with the former, and a civic group of
a nation or union of nations independent of the religious group but higher
in the hierarchy than any ethnic group. These are not, need not be,
exclusive commitments. Indeed, one can be a member of an ethnic group
and still have commitments to the civic values of a more inclusive nation
or union of nations. The mentor’s judicial attitude intelligently exercised by
the guidance of a clear understanding of relation amongst principles, makes
it possible for him to foster the emergence of the novice’s judicial attitude.
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In the ethical realm normally, principles and rules are in subsidiary
awareness while one meets the elements of situations. The crucial mentoring
task is to clarify the relationship amongst the rules to the novice, to go beyond the “flat
earth” view by directing the novice’s attention back and forth between levels of
elements, rules and principles. Without this skill, he will not be able to develop
an understanding of the meaning of choices, and most importantly, he will
not be able to tap his subsidiary awareness to reformulate standards and
general maxims. He will obey rules automatically rather than have self-
determination. Self-determination is the core characteristic of free people.
This does not exclude a rational acknowledgment of constraints by
historical facts.
7. Tacit knowledge ethics amongst others
It may be said that the above sketch resembles a pragmatist approach, or
that of a moral realist of the intuitionist sort, or perhaps a Kantian view. In
certain respects, it does, yet it is none of these. 
Like the pragmatists, the tacit knowledge ethics bypasses is-ought
dualism, and relies on inquiry to solve moral problems when one is faced
with an ambiguous situation or a plurality of rules. But it is not like the
pragmatist approach, in that moral principles in tacit knowledge ethics are
not hypotheses to be tested and that would lead to relativism.
Like the moral realists, a tacit knowledge ethics holds that moral
principles override natural ones, but unlike them, holds that morality
precedes epistemology, because free will is a precondition for both choice
and knowledge. Like the intuitionists among moral realists, tacit knowledge
ethics holds that moral properties can be “intuited” and that moral truth is
“non-epistemic”. However, both these terms are redefined in tacit
knowledge ethics: “intuit” means skillful guessing (tacit knowing at the
personal pole), and “non-epistemic” means that knowing is not detached
knowing, but lived knowing. In tacit knowledge epistemology, knowing at
the external objective pole is grounded in the personal pole by the link of
tacit inference in logic; in ethics, the claim of moral truth is linked to truth
itself at the external (objective) pole by the judicial attitude. Knowing and
moral action are grounded in the tacit and linked to the explicit, that is,
there is objective knowledge and objective truth.
Tacit knowledge ethics is like Kant’s in that moral justification is a priori.
Nevertheless experience is required for the acquisition of some of the
constituent concepts, sensory and introspective; in tacit knowledge ethics,
moral justification rests on principles held tacitly in subsidiary awareness.
These principles are acquired by experience. Kant’s practical reason is like
the judicial attitude in that practical reason determines “rules” for the will
while the judicial attitude determines intentional action. And just as for the
judicial attitude, for practical reason belief in moral principles, not dogma,
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is the foundation for guiding coherent action3. For Kant, moral principles
must be accessible to us for legislating for ourselves, and pure practical
reason determines independently from sensibility the realm of freedom and
what ought to be. In the ethics of tacit knowing, moral principles are
accessible to us after training our awareness (with the help of a mentor) to
tap into the subsidiary. This will enable us to make a responsible judgement
with universal intent. These are all premised on freedom of the will. The
ethics of tacit knowing is unlike Kant’s in that the judicial attitude is not
severed from sensibility, is and ought, fact and value are linked rather than
separated, and the empirical (fact) aspect is not relegated to a
supplementary position. What is actually done is considered as a teaching
tool for what ought to be done4. Yet what ought to be done (the value) is
more fundamental. Tacit knowledge ethics is also unlike Kant’s in that
Kant’s approach is to go “from top down”, from the principle to rules to
cases, while this proposal starts with cases, then taps into principles and
rules, moving up and down the hierarchy5. This proposal is unlike Kant’s,
for a degree of pluralism must be worked out in the layer under the
universal principles and taken into view when judgements are made in the
hierarchy of principles under consideration. 
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3 As in Kant, in Tacit Knowledge ethics, one is choosing and judging from the moral point of view
if and only if one is willing to universalize one’s maxim or rule. But this formulation works better in
the negative: that which cannot be willed to be universalizable, is immoral.
4 Empirical facts are also taken into consideration in the formalization of principles.
5 It may be said, that the full meaning of principles, of justice and duty, emerge as the ethical
problem is worked through.
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